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The once staid field of copyright law has undergone a dramatic revolution
in recent years, as new technologies and international trade pressures have
spurred legislative change, while challenging the federal courts to find an-
swers to those questions that Congress has not resolved or, in some cases,
to questions that recent acts of Congress have created.
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Liability for Digital Transmission of Copyrighted
Works
In the now infamous case of A&M Records Inc. v. Nap-
ster Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit agreed with District Judge
Marilyn Hall Patel that the plaintiff record companies
were likely to succeed on their infringement claims
where Napster's file-swapping software and search
mechanisms facilitated the unauthorized copying and
distribution of copyrighted musical recordings. The ap-
pellate court agreed with Judge Patel that Napster should
be enjoined from engaging in or facilitating the unautho-
rized copying, downloading, uploading, transmission, or
distribution of copyrighted sound recordings. The Ninth
Circuit also rejected Napster's arguments that the copying
that Napster facilitated was permitted under the Audio
Home Recording Act 2 or the "fair use" privilege. 3
However, the Ninth Circuit criticized Judge Patel's pre-
liminary injunction as overbroad. That injunction had or-
dered Napster to "ensure that no work owned by plain-
tiffs which neither defendant nor Napster users have per-
mission to use or distribute is uploaded or downloaded
on Napster."4 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that contrib-
utory liability could be imposed only if Napster (1) knew
or had reason to know that infringing files were being
accessed through its system, and (2) failed to take action
to prevent such access. 5 On remand, Judge Patel modi-
fied her original injunction to require the record labels,
as a condition of obtaining injunctive relief for each in-
fringed recording, to notify Napster of the specific artist
and title of that recording and to identify the name of at
least one file containing that work on Napster's system.6
In the aftermath of the preliminary injunction, Napster
was forced to block users' access to unauthorized copies
of sound recordings that previously had been accessible
through its file-sharing system. This has essentially deci-
mated the inventory that attracted users in the first place.
Napster has now suspended its users' unregulated file-
swapping activities while it restructures its operation to
become a membership service and negotiates licenses
with record labels and music publishers in order to en-
sure that copyright owners will be compensated for the
copying of their works by Napster users. Napster's users,
in the meantime, have flocked to other unregulated peer-
to-peer file-sharing systems. Undaunted, Napster has
continued its legal battle, challenging the validity of the
record labels' copyright ownership claims.7
Interpreting Old Contracts in Light of New
Technology
In New York Times Co. Inc. v. Tasini,8 the Supreme
Court held that a freelance writer's copyright was in-
fringed by the electronic republication of an individual
article that the plaintiff writer had licensed for inclusion
in the defendant's print periodical.
The Tasini plaintiffs were freelance writers who had
contributed articles to various print periodicals during
the early 1990s. The writers retained their copyrights,
and the licenses they granted to the publishers of these
periodicals did not include the right to reproduce the in-
dividual articles in searchable electronic databases such
as LEXIS/NEXIS or various CD-ROM compilations.
Nonetheless, the periodical publishers later licensed the
reproduction of the plaintiffs' articles in the defendants'
searchable electronic databases. Users of any one of
these databases could search for and read each of the in-
dividual articles contained in that database. They could
not, however, view the other materials that had accom-
panied that article in the original periodical unless they
conducted a separate search for each of those materials.
Thus, each of the plaintiffs' articles could be viewed sep-
arately from the context that had surrounded it in the
original print publication.
When the writers sued for the infringing reproduction
and distribution of their individual articles, the defen-
dants took the position that their electronic re-publica-
tion of the articles was privileged by 17 U.S.C. § 201(c),
which provides:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copy-
right or of any rights under it, the owner of copy-
right in the collective work is presumed to have ac-
quired only the privilege of reproducing and dis-
tributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective
work, and any later collective work in the same se-
ries.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Sec-
ond Circuit's ruling in favor of the writers, holding that
§ 201(c) did not authorize the reproduction or distribu-
tion of the individual articles in the defendants' electron-
ic databases. Specifically, the Court held that the manner
in which each article appeared in these databases consti-
tuted neither a reproduction of the original print compi-
lations nor a "revision" of those compilations. Instead,
the Court held that the articles appeared in the databases
simply as individual articles "standing alone."9 The Court
distinguished microfilm and microfiche reproductions on
the grounds that these formats involve a perceptible re-
production of the entire compilation in which an article
appears. 10
Tasini will have a significant effect on electronic re-
publishers of collective works. In the past, many contri-
butions to collective print publications were prepared
under licensing agreements that did not expressly grant
electronic re-publication rights. Yet many such works
have been republished in searchable electronic databases
such as those at issue in Tasini. Unless Congress pro-
vides a legislative solution, electronic republishers of
such works must now consider whether to negotiate li-
censing agreements with the authors of each individual
article or to delete those articles from their databases. 11
The potential cost of due diligence to identify such
works that are already in electronic databases is stagger-
ing in itself, without even considering the cost of locat-
ing the authors and negotiating licenses for those works.
This may lead some electronic publishers to take a wait-
and-see attitude, hoping to work out reasonable settle-
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ments with any authors who come forward to assert their
rights. With respect to new publication contracts, of
course, it has become standard to address electronic
publication rights at the outset, thus avoiding future Tasi-
ni problems with respect to those contracts.
Sound Recordings: The Work-Made-for-Hire
Question
In the late 1990s, several federal courts ruled that
sound recordings do not qualify as "works made for
hire" for copyright purposes unless the creative partici-
pants are bona fide employees of the party claiming au-
thorship.1 2 These decisions raised concerns in the
recording industry, which had assumed until then that
record labels were the "authors" of their recordings,
rather than mere copyright assignees.
In a bizarre flip-flop, Congress legislatively overruled
these holdings in 1999, then retroactively repealed this
legislation in 2000, leaving the status of sound recordings
even less certain than it was before the federal court de-
cisions.
The saga began when Congress acceded to a request
from the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) to add a "technical amendment" to the Intellectu-
al Property and Omnibus Communications Reform Act of
1999, adding sound recordings to the list of works eligi-
ble for contractual work-made-for-hire status under para-
graph 2 of the statutory definition of "works made for
hire." 13 This amendment would, at least prospectively,
have permitted record companies to eliminate the un-
waivable termination rights that would otherwise have
entitled the authors of sound recordings (typically musi-
cians, producers, and possibly sound engineers) to re-
claim the copyright in their recordings after a statutorily
defined term of years, notwithstanding any copyright li-
cense or assignment they might have executed in favor
of the record label. 14 As a result of this legislative
change, recording artists would forever have been barred
from reclaiming authorship of their recordings. 15
When recording artists and copyright scholars learned
that this legislation had been enacted virtually overnight,
without congressional hearings or debate and without
opportunity for public comment, their resulting outrage
led to the retroactive repeal of this amendment.16 Thus,
sound recordings are once again conspicuously absent
from the list of eligible works in paragraph 2 of the
"work made for hire" definition. However, in an appar-
ent effort to placate the RIAA, Congress added new lan-
guage to the end of the "work made for hire" definition
in order to dispel any suggestion that the repeal of the
1999 amendment signaled a decision that sound record-
ings are not eligible for work-made-for-hire status. The
resulting statutory language seems more suited to Alice
in Wonderland than the U.S. code:
In determining whether any work is eligible to be
considered a work made for hire under paragraph
(2), neither the amendment contained in section
1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communi-
cations Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by
section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the
deletion of the words added by that amendment -
(a) shall be considered or otherwise given
any legal significance, or
(b) shall be interpreted to indicate congres-
sional approval or disapproval of, or ac-
quiescence in, any judicial determination,
by the courts or the copyright office. Paragraph (2)
shall be interpreted as if both § 2(a)(1) of the Work
Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of
2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Proper-
ty Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999,
as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-
113, were never enacted, and without regard to any
inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time
of any judicial determinations. 17
What is the status of sound recordings today? Thanks
to ineffectual policy-making by Congress, a simple ques-
tion that can and should have a clear legislative resolu-
tion has once again been relegated to piecemeal litiga-
tion. 18
World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Holds that
17 U.S.C. § 1 10(5)(B) Violates International Law
In the 1998 Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 19 Con-
gress revised the old "homestyle exemption" of 17 U.S.C.
5 110(5), which granted businesses in certain circum-
stances a limited privilege to publicly perform copyright-
ed works by making radio or television broadcasts of
those works available to their customers at no charge. 20
This exception was most often invoked by restaurants
and retail stores that aired radio or television programs
for their customers. The amendment, which appears at
17 U.S.C. 5 110(5)(B) (and redesignates the old § 110(5)
homestyle exemption as new § 110(5)(A)), creates a safe
harbor for audio or audiovisual public performances of
nondramatic musical works at commercial establishments
based on specific guidelines addressing the size of the
establishment and the nature of the equipment used. 21
According to one study, the new safe harbor has the ef-
fect of exempting the majority of bars and restaurants in
the United States from liability for such performances. 22
In the summer of 2000, a World Trade Organization
(WTO) Dispute Panel ruled that § 110(5)(B) violates Arti-
cles 9 and 13 of the TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property) provisions of the WTO Agreement
(previously known as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, or GATT), 23 because it creates too broad an
exception to the public performance right in musical
compositions, a right that Article 9.1 of TRIPs requires all
WTO countries to guarantee to the owners of such copy-
righted works.24 The requirements of Article 9.1 are sub-
ject to exceptions only in "certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
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the right holder,"25 and the panel found that 5 110(5)(B)
exceeded the scope of this exception.
The panel rejected a similar challenge to the newly
amended § 110(5)(A), concluding that the scope of the
5 110(5)(A) privilege was sufficiently narrow that it did
not unreasonably prejudice the rights of copyright hold-
ers.26 However, in the pursuit of this favorable ruling, the
U.S. representatives advanced a narrow interpretation of
5 110(5)(A), suggesting that the enactment of new sub-
section (B) in 1998 (together with the addition to subsec-
tion (A) of the prefatory phrase "except as provided in
subparagraph B"), had the effect of narrowing the scope
of subsection (A) so that it applies only to works other
than nondramatic musical works.27
Thus, the homestyle exemption that the panel upheld
in § 110(5)(A) is far narrower than its immediate prede-
cessor, the original § 110(5) homestyle exemption.
Pre-1998 case law had routinely applied the old home-
style exemption (that is, the version that predated the
1998 amendments) to transmissions of nondramatic mu-
sical works, and, indeed, such works were the subject of
the vast majority of those cases.28 However, after the
1998 amendments, the insertion of the prefatory "except
as" language in subsection (A), coupled with the broad
safe harbor in subsection (B) does seem to make subsec-
tion (A) largely irrelevant for establishments that perform
nondramatic musical works, since it appears that most
performances of such works that would be exempt un-
der subsection (A) will also be exempt under the safe
harbor of subsection (B). Thus, the safe harbor in most
cases eliminates the need for a potential defendant to in-
voke subsection (A) with respect to performances of
nondramatic musical works. As long as the subsection
(B) safe harbor remains in effect, only in unusual situa-
tions will a potential defendant wish to argue for the ap-
plication of subsection (A) with respect to nondramatic
musical works. If the newly narrowed interpretation of
subsection (A) is correct, of course, that defendant will
ultimately be unsuccessful, because subsection (A) no
longer applies to such works.
If Congress does not repeal or amend § 110(5)(B) in
order to bring the United States into compliance with
TRIPs, the WTO may impose trade sanctions on the Unit-
ed States. Although the WTO originally imposed a dead-
line of July 27, 2001, for the United States to amend
5 110(5) to eliminate the conflict with Article 13,29 it has
twice extended that deadline. 30 In exchange, the United
States submitted to binding WTO arbitration to determine
the amount of damages to be paid to European copy-
right owners for the unlicensed performances that have
been, and continue to be, permitted under § 110(5)(B). 31
As a result of that arbitration, the United States is obligat-
ed to pay approximately $1.1 million in damages per
year until it brings 5 110(5) into compliance with
TRIPS.3 2
If § 110(5)(B) is repealed, Congress will also have to
consider the effect of this repeal on the scope of the
original homestyle exemption that is currently embodied
in § 110(5)(A). A simple repeal of the subsection (B) safe
harbor will once again make it necessary to include non-
dramatic musical works in subsection (A), thus largely
restoring the pre-1998 homestyle exemption and all the
ambiguities thereof. It would be far better for Congress
to attempt another overhaul and update the entire 110(5)
exemption in order to provide clearer guidelines to bars,
restaurants, and other establishments.
Anti-Circumvention Provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 1201
Controversy continues to surround the anti-circumven-
tion rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), 33 which have significant effects on the public's
ability to access and use copyrighted works in a manner
permitted by fair use34 and the First Amendment.35
The anti-circumvention provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 1201
give copyright owners a cause of action against persons
who circumvent - or offer to others the means to cir-
cumvent - the technological measures (such as encryp-
tion) that copyright owners have begun to utilize to con-
trol access to their digitized works. 36 Section 1201 recog-
nizes only certain narrow exceptions to these rules - for
example, for certain activities related to law enforcement,
encryption research, and reverse engineering. 37 In addi-
tion to these exceptions, the statute authorizes the U.S.
Copyright Office to issue regulations exempting entire
classes of works as to which enforcement of § 1201
would interfere with noninfringing uses of such works. 38
Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the U.S. Copyright
Office conducted rulemaking hearings in the spring of
2000 to identify such classes of works and issued its reg-
ulations in October 2000.39 The new regulations exempt
only two narrowly defined classes of works: (1) compila-
tions of Web site lists that are blocked by filtering soft-
ware and (2) literary works with malfunctioning access-
control mechanisms.
To the extent these exemptions apply, they will pre-
clude a cause of action against those who circumvent
technological protections to access copyrighted works of
these particular types. However, as a practical matter, a
user's ability to make noninfringing use of such works
will still be hampered by the need to circumvent the
anti-copying technology in the first place.
More important from a legal perspective, however, is
the fact that the scope of both the statutory and regulato-
ry exemptions from the § 1201 cause of action is signifi-
cantly narrower than the scope of the fair use doctrine.
Thus, certain fair uses of copyrighted works that are ex-
empt from a § 106 infringement claim will, in effect, be
actionable by copyright owners under § 1201 if the de-
fendants accessed those works through prohibited cir-
cumvention. Criminal as well as civil penalties are possi-
ble, 40 and a federal grand jury has already indicted a
"hacker" who allegedly wrote and offered for sale a pro-
gram for decrypting electronic books.4 1
The technological ability of copyright owners to fore-
close public access to their works, together with the ad-
ditional legal protection afforded by § 1201, raises signifi-
cant questions about the future of public access to copy-
righted works. As digital communications technologies
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replace print publications, and as electronic libraries re-
place physical libraries, what is the future of fair use?
How can the public make fair use of materials to which
they are denied access? Is the fair use of copyrighted ma-
terials a right, the exercise of which copyright owners
should not be permitted to impede through copy-protec-
tion technology? Or is it merely a privilege, which insu-
lates the user of copyrighted material from liability but
does not guarantee that the user will have access to that
material in the first place? Will § 1201 and the use of en-
cryption technology and similar access-control devices -
combined with the gradual demise of print publication as
a significant mode of dissemination - effectively elimi-
nate the public's ability to make fair use of copyrighted
materials or even their ability to access such works?4 2
This convergence of law and technology may signifi-
cantly undermine the fundamental bargain that underlies
federal copyright law. The limits that copyright law cur-
rently imposes (and has traditionally imposed) on the
monopoly rights of copyright owners can now be largely
circumvented through the use of technology that pre-
vents access to those works in the first place.43 In effect,
works can now be created, copyrighted, and commer-
cially exploited without ever requiring their owners to
permit the degree of public access that would enable in-
terested persons to read (or hear or view) the work and
make fair use of it. At least with respect to works that
lend themselves to access-protection technology, the de-
velopment of these technological barriers to public ac-
cess, combined with congressional endorsement of these
barriers, potentially gives rise to a monopoly far greater
than that traditionally associated with copyright. TFL
Mary LaFrance is a professor of law and associate dean
for academic affairs at the William S. Boyd School of
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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Title
0 Male 0 Female
Last Name
Date of Birth
First Admission to Bar in US. (required, unless applying for law stu-











0 Private 0 Military 0 Retired 0 Government 0 Corporate 0 Judiciary
2. FBA ANiJAu Duis
0 Member Admitted to bar 5 years or more .................................... $95
0 Member Admitted to bar fewer than 5 years ................... $50
0 Retired Member Fully retired from thepractice of law ................ $50
0 Foreign Associate Admitted to practice law outside U.S ................. $95
Country Court/Admin.istrative Tribunal
0 Law Student Associate Enrolled at an accredited law school ........ $10
Law School Expected Date of Graduation
0 Sustaining Member - Optional This category is in addition to regular
dues. It is used to support CLE programs and publications ............................... $60
Dues Total Please enter amount in line 5A of the Dues Worksheet .......... $ __
3. IAL CHAPTER AFFILIATION You will be assigned to your local chapter
(Unless you belong to ike following chapter,--Adlanta $10, Northern Dist. of Ohio
$10, South Texas $25, Iowa $10, Memphi Mid-South $5 Puerto Rico $10. and
Tucson $10-your chapter doer not hav dtes.)
Dues Total Please enter amount in line 5B of the Dues Worksheet ........... __
*Note Contributions and dues to the FBA may be deductible by members underpro-
visions of the IRS Code, such as an ordinary and necessary business expense, except
1.68% which is used for congressional lobbying and is not deductible. Your FBA
dues include $14 for a yearly subscription to the FBA's professional magazine.
4. CAREERs DIVIsioNs AND SUBSTANTIVE law SECTIoNs Please check all
diision(s) and/or section(s) you wash to join.
Career Divisions
0 Federal Career Service (must be past/present employee of the federal
government) .......................................................................................... N/C
0 judiciary (must be past/present member or staff of a judiciary) ................ $10
0 Corporate and Association Counsels (past/present member of corprate/
association counsel's staid ....................................................................... $10
0 Senior Lawyers* (must be age 55 or over) .............................................. $10
0 Younger Lawyers* (must be age 36 or younger or admitted to practice less
than 3 years) ................................. ........................................... N/C
*For eligibility, date of birth must be provided in the first section.
Substantive Law Sections
0 Adm inistrative Law .............................................................. . . ...... $15
0 Alternative Dispute Resolution .......................................................... $15
0 Antitrust and Trade Regulation ........................................................ $15
0 Bankruptcy Law .................................................................................. $10
0 Crim inal Law .................................................................................... $5
0 Environment, Energy, & Natural Resources ...................................... $15
0 Federal Litigation ................................................................................ $10
0 Financial Institutions and the Economy .................................... N/C
0 General Counsels ............................................................................ N/C
0 Government Contracts ........................................................................ $10
0 Health Law .......................................................................................... $10
0 Im m igration Law ................................................................................ $10
0 Indian Law ....................................................................................... $5
0 Intellectual Property & Com m unications Law .................................... $10
0 International Law .............................................................................. $10
0 Labor and Employment Law .............................................................. $10
0 Social Security ................................................................................... $10
0 State and Local Government Relations ................................................ $5
0 Taxation ............................................................................................ $10
0 Transportation Law ............................................................................ $15
0 Veterans Law ...................................................................................... $10
Dues Total Please enter amount in line 5C of the Dues Worksheet ............. S_
5. DUrES WOiKSHErr
FBA Dues .................................................................................. 5A $
Local Chapter ............................................................................ 5B $
Section or Division Dues .......................................................... 5C $ __
Total Amu Enclosed (Add 5A, 5B, 5C) ............................. __
6. PymENr IqFoRmATioN
0 Check payable to Federal Bar Association
0 VISA 0 MasterCard 3 Diners Club 0 American Express
Card No. Exp. Date
X
Signature Date
The undersigned hereby applies for membership in the Federal Bar Association and
agrees to conform to its Constitution and Bylaws and to the rules and regulations
prescribed by its National Council.
X
Signature of Applicant Date
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